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We establish an inverse relationship between family ties and political participation, such that the more
individuals rely on the family as a provider of services, insurance, transfer of resources, the lower
is one’s civic engagment and political participation. We also show that strong family ties appear to
be a substitute for generalized trust, rather than a complement to it. These three constructs-civic engagement,
political participation, and trust- are part of what is known as social capital; therefore, in this paper,
we contribute to the investigation of the origin and evolution of social capital. We establish these results
using within-country evidence and looking at the behavior of immigrants from various countries in
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Well functioning democracies need citizens’ participation in politics. The con-
cept of politics is broader than simply voting in elections, including a host of
activities like volunteering as an unpaid campaign worker, debating politics with
others, and attending political meetings (e.g., campaign appearances of candi-
dates), joining political groups, participating in boycott activities, strikes or
demonstrations, writing letters to representatives and so on. What determines
it?
The purpose of this paper is to investigate an hypothesis put forward by
Banﬁeld (1958) in his study of a southern Italian village. In this study, he deﬁnes
"amoral familism" as a social equilibrium in which people exclusively trust (and
care about) their immediate family, expect everybody else to behave in that way
and therefore (rationally) do not trust non family members and do not expect
to be trusted outside the family1. He argues that amoral familism leads to low
civic engagement, low political participation, low generalized trust, and a lack
of conﬁdence in political institutions. As a result, amoral familism prevents the
development of well-functioning political institutions, creates a situation where
politics is simply a private aﬀair of those who control it, common goods are
completely disregarded and there is very little interest in participating in public
aﬀairs. In other words, the more the family is all that matters for an individual,
the less he or she will care about the rest of society and the polity.
In this paper, we look at the relationship between family ties and political
participation on the one hand, and family ties and the level of generalized trust
on the other hand. We argue that a lack of political participation and generalized
trust is transmitted from parents to children in strong family ties societies.
Therefore, once political attitudes are acquired, they tend to remain fairly stable
over time. As a result, attitudes of dissatisfaction with politics do not vary
with the fortunes of speciﬁc parties or candidates. In societies where trust is
built overwhelmingly on the family, modern democracy will face long-lasting
challenges if these negative attitudes towards politics are transmitted from one
generation to the next.
In Alesina and Giuliano (2007) we measured the strength of family ties,
i.e. the extent to which in diﬀerent cultures family members are closely tied
together, using answers to survey questions. Amoral familism would be the
(pathological) extreme in the direction of strong family ties, so strong that they
are the "only" social connection that matters. In the present paper we test the
idea that political participation and civic engagement are inversely related to the
closeness of family ties. Even casual observations reveal a correlation between
strength of family ties and civic engagement. In Northern European cultures,
family ties are relatively low and social capital, trust and political participation
are high; the opposite holds for Southern European cultures. A comparison of
northern and southern Italy (a widely-studied country in the literature on social
1It is indeed not a coincidence that Italian maﬁa clans identify themselves as "families."
Trust within a maﬁa family is an absolute necessity, and complete distrust for outsiders is a
key ingredient of the maﬁa organization. See Gambetta (1990).
2capital), points to a similar correlation2. Note that political participation, trust,
and civic engagement are part of what is known as social capital, therefore in
this paper we contribute to the investigation of the origin and evolution of social
capital over time, a topic investigated in particular by Putnam (1983, 2000) and
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008a).
Cultural values like the strength of family ties can be explanatory variables
of political participation if they are relatively slow-moving. In fact, cultural
values like the structure of the family are very stable over time as shown in many
diﬀerent ways by Alesina and Giuliano (2007), Bertrand and Schoar (2006),
Reher (1998) and Todd (1985). The transmission of values regarding the family
relies on parents-child relationships: parents teach children values about only
trusting the family, or trusting others, for instance. For a recent discussion on
the intergenerational transmission of values from parents to children through
institutions and beliefs, see Bisin and Verdier (2001), Tabellini (2008) and Guiso,
Sapienza and Zingales (2008b). See also Hauk and Saez Marti (2002) on the
cultural transmission of corruption.
We gather our evidence in two ways. First, we use the World Value Survey for
a within country analysis. (We do not rely on capturing, say the diﬀerences be-
tween the average Norwegian and the average Italian, a comparison that may be
aﬀected by a host of other variables diﬀerentiating the two countries.) The sec-
ond source of evidence is a comparison of political participation among second-
generation immigrants in 32 diﬀerent destination countries. The approach of
studying immigrant behavior has been used in a growing literature on the eco-
nomic eﬀects of culture. Alesina and Giuliano (2007), Algan and Cahuc (2009),
Blau (1992), Carroll et al. (1994), Fernandez and Fogli (2009), Giuliano (2007)
and Luttmer and Singhal (2009) analyze the behavior of immigrant groups to
determine the eﬀects of culture on female labor force participation, trust, fer-
tility, savings, geographical mobility, and preferences for redistribution among
many others3. Rather than using the United States as unique destination coun-
try, in this paper we look at immigrants coming not only from multiple source
countries, but also going to multiple destination countries. By comparing the
relationship between the family ties and political participation of immigrants
from diﬀerent origins, we further eliminate any eﬀect emerging from making
cross-country comparisons. By looking at immigrants going to multiple desti-
nation countries, we also limit the likelihood of selection bias since we would
expect the form of selection to diﬀer across diﬀerent destination countries.4 We
also look at immigrants to study the relationship between family ties in the
country of origin and the level of generalized trust. Establishing causality in
this case is more diﬃcult as both family ties and lack of trust could be persistent
2Orizo (1996) also ﬁnds that in Spain the great majority of youth expresses little interest
in politics or in belonging to political organisations.
3See also the survey by Guiso et al. (2006) on the impact of culture on economic outcomes.
4Note that to the extent that diﬀerent cultures have diﬀerent levels of preferences for active
political participation, changes in the composition of the pool of immigrants may at least in
part explain the reduction in participation in social activities, as pointed out by Putnam
(2000).
3cultural traits passed from parents to children and therefore could persist across
generations. While we cannot prove that there is a causal link going from fam-
ily ties to generalized trust, we argue that this link is plausible and consistent
with additional evidence. Bertrand and Schoar (2006) show that family ties are
more slow moving than trust for a large set of countries. Similarly, Ermish and
Gambetta (2008) provide evidence that in an experimental setting people with
strong family ties have a lower level of trust in strangers than people with weak
family ties. They also argue that this association is causal rather than the result
of selection.
Political participation and trust are obviously aﬀected by many other factors
besides family ties. In particular, we ﬁnd that education is strongly positively
associated with political participation, a result in line with Glaeser, Ponzetto
and Shleifer (2007). We ﬁnd that many individual characteristics aﬀect trust,
in line with Alesina and La Ferrara (2002)5. There is also a vast literature
in political science on what determines turnout in elections (see Merlo (2006)
and Wolﬁnger and Rosenstone (1980) for a review) but our emphasis here is
not speciﬁcally on turnout but on a broader deﬁnition of political engagement.
Finally, our paper is also related to the sociologial literature on the importance
of social capital in the determination of economic outcomes among immigrants
(Portes and Sensebrenner 1993).
We should stress that we are not implying that family ties (perhaps with
the exception of the extreme case of amoral familism) are "bad". In fact, in
Alesina and Giuliano (2007) we show that life satisfaction and happiness are
positively associated with strong family ties. In addition, the amount of home
production is substantially higher in strong family ties societies, implying that
their level of GDP can be underestimated. This shows that the eﬀect of family
relationships is complex and not unidirectional. Strong or weak family ties are
neither "bad" nor "good" but they lead to diﬀerent organizations of the family
and have diﬀerent social implications.6 In this paper we investigate the eﬀects of
family ties on political participation. Interestingly, to the extent that in some
cases political participation may turn ugly it would be interesting to check
whether stronger family ties also imply fewer instances of negative or hateful
forms of political participation. Todd (1985) argues that indeed certain types of
family structures are more or less compatible with more or less desirable forms
of political organization like dictatorships versus liberal democracies. Further
investigation of this point is left for future research.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe our data
and our measures of family ties and of political participation. In Section 3 we
present international evidence based upon the World Value Survey. In Section
4 we focus on immigrants. The last section concludes.
5The same authors (Alesina and La Ferrara (2004)) investigate the eﬀect of racial frag-
mentation on participation in social activities ﬁnding a negative correlation between the two.
6See Esping Andersen (1999) for an illustration of the role of the family in diﬀerent cultures
as a provider of social insurance.
42 Empirical strategy
2.1 Data description
We use two data sets, the World Value Survey and the European Social Survey.
The World Value Survey (WVS) is a compilation of national surveys on values
and norms on a wide variety of topics, carried out four times (1981-84, 1990-
1993, 1995-97 and 1999-2004.) The coverage varies depending on the wave. The
1981-1983 survey covered 22 countries, the 1990-1993 wave 42, the 1995-1997
wave 54 and, ﬁnally the last wave covered 81 countries. The questionnaires
contain information on diﬀerent types of attitudes, religion and preferences,
as well as information on standard demographic characteristics (gender, age,
education, labor market status, income, etc.) We also use data from three
rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS), a biennial cross-sectional survey
administered in a large sample of mostly European nations. The survey was
conducted in three waves, in 2002/2003, 2004/2005 and 2006/2007. Thirty-two
countries participated in at least one round of the survey (22 in the ﬁrst, 26
in the second and 25 in the last). The list of countries for both the World
Value Survey and the European Social Survey, together with the demographic
characteristics of our sample for both surveys are given in Appendix, Tables 4,
5, 6 and 7.
For the European Social Survey our primary sample consists of second-
generation immigrants (we deﬁne immigrants as individuals born in a certain
country but whose fathers were born abroad). We associate to each immigrant
the level of family ties in the home country as measured by the average at the
country level calculated in the World Value Survey database. Summary statis-
tics for second generation immigrants are provided in Appendix, Tables 7 and
8. The sample provides at least 13 observations per country of origin. The
most representative groups come from the Russian Federation (850 observa-
tions), followed by Germany, Italy and Turkey. The respondents in our sample
of second-generation immigrants are on average 48 years old, 45% are men, 14%
of them have only primary education, 5% of them are unemployed, 52% are
out of the labor force, with an yearly average family income between 18000 and
24000 euros7. Demographic characteristics, variables on political participation,
7In the ESS income is deﬁned as total net household income. Each respondent is asked to
report which income category, identiﬁed with a letter, best approximates his or her household’s
total net income. This includes income from all sources, including labor income and income
from capital and investments. In order to facilitate the answers, the question is framed in
a way that accounts for country-speciﬁc conventions in the frequency of income payments.
Respondents can provide the income ﬁgure using the frequency they know best: weekly,
monthly or annual. Each letter identiﬁes an income bracket in euros (the 12 income categories
for the annual income ﬁgures are less than 1800, 1800 to under 3600, 3600 to under 6000, 6000
to under 12000, 12000 to under 18000, 18000 to under 24000, 24000 to under 30000, 30000 to
under 36000, 36000 to under 60000, 60000 to under 90000, 90000 to under 120000, 120000 or
more) deﬁn e ds oa st ob ec o n s i s t e n ta c r o s sd i ﬀerent frequencies. For instance, the ﬁrst income
category identiﬁes income below 40 euros per week or below 150 euros per month or below
1800 euros per year. These ﬁgures are equivalent if a month is made of four paid working
w e e k sa n day e a ro f1 2p a i dw o r k i n gm o n t h s .
5trust and attitudes towards society of second-generation immigrants are not
statistically diﬀerent from those of natives.
Table 8 in the Appendix also reports summary statistics of demographic
variables and political participation of immigrants by country. There is a lot of
heterogeneity across immigrant groups: Northern European countries tend to
have a higher level of trust and more interest in political participation. Southern
European groups are among the groups with the lowest levels of trust and lower
interest in politics. Eastern European countries lie somewhere in between: on
the one hand they do show a low level of trust, on the other they do have a
higher interest in politics. Income levels also vary greatly, with immigrants from
Russia and Latvia in the lowest range, and those from Northern Europe, the
UK and Canada among the richest.
2.1.1 A measure of family ties
We measure the strength of family ties by looking at three variables from the
WVS which capture beliefs regarding the importance of the family in the re-
spondent’s life, the duties and responsibilities of parents and children, and the
love and respect for one’s own parents. The ﬁrst question assesses how impor-
tant the family is in one person’s life and can take values from 1 to 4 (with 1
being very important and 4 not important at all). The second question asks
whether the respondent agrees with one of the two statements (taking the values
of 1 and 2, respectively): 1) Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one’s
parents are, one must always love and respect them, 2) One does not have the
duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it. The third question
prompts respondents to agree with one of the following statements (again taking
the values of 1 and 2, respectively): 1) It is the parents’ duty to do their best
for their children even at the expense of their own well-being; 2) Parents have
a life of their own and should not be asked to sacriﬁce their own well-being for
t h es a k eo ft h e i rc h i l d r e n .
W ec o m b i n et h e s em e a s u r e si nt w ow a y s .F i r s tw et a k et h es u mo fa l lo ft h e m
and recode the variables such that a higher number corresponds to stronger fam-
ily ties. Second, we extract the ﬁrst principal component from the whole data
set with all individual responses for the original variables. Figure 1 displays
the values of our measure of the strength of family ties (expressed using the
ﬁrst principal component) at the country level. The ranking of the diﬀerent
countries is broadly consistent with perceptions and insights from the socio-
logical and political science literature. Germany, Netherlands and the Northern
European countries have the weakest ties, while African, Asian and Latin Amer-
ican countries lie in the highest range. Among OECD countries, we ﬁnd that
Poland, US, Canada and Southern European countries (with the somewhat sur-
prising exception of Greece) are among the countries with the strongest ties,
while as before Northern Europe, Netherlands and Germany have the weakest
ties. Note that the US is an average of very diﬀerent levels of family ties de-
pending on the origin of the members of the "melting pot". The weak family
ties of many Central and Eastern European former communist countries may
6be the result of communist collectivist ideology and propaganda (see Alesina
and Fuchs-Schulden (2007)).8 The analysis that follows, however, will use only
within country evidence.
2.1.2 Dependent Variables
Political attitudes The ﬁrst group of variables contains measures of political
participation, such as general interest in politics and a variety of other indica-
tors of political action. Interest in politics is measured by the following three
questions. The ﬁrst asks the respondent: "When you get together with your
friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or
never?" The variable takes the values of 3 if participants report Frequently, 2
if they answer Occasionally and 1 if the answer is Never. The answer to the
second question, "Are you currently doing unpaid voluntary work for political
parties or groups?" is equal to 1 if the answer is "Yes" and 0 otherwise. The
third variable indicates the general interest of the person in politics and it is
phrased as follows: "How interested would you say you are in politics?"a n dt h e
answer could take the following four values: "Very interested" (4), "Somewhat
interested" (3), "Not very interested" (2) and "Not at all interested" (1).
Political action is measured by looking at the following questions: "Now I
a mg o i n gt or e a do u ts o m ed i ﬀerent forms of political action that people can take,
a n dIw o u l dl i k et ot e l lm e ,f o re a c ho n e ,w h e t h e ry o uh a v ea c t u a l l yd o n ea n yo f
these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances,
do it", where the forms of political action are i) signing a petition, ii) joining
in boycotts, iii) attending lawful demonstrations, iv) joining unoﬃcial strikes
and v) occupying buildings or factories. The answer for each form of political
action could take the following three values: "Have done" (3), "Might do" (2)
and "Would never do" (1). Note that each question is asked independently,
meaning the respondent is not supposed to respond at the same time about the
diﬀerent forms of political participation.
Trust, reluctance to change and obedience According to Banﬁeld and
Putnam, we should expect a strong association between family ties and the
level of trust for his/her own family, but a lower association with the level of
generalized trust. This was the essence of amoral familism. In order to capture
these cultural features of strong family ties, we consider the following questions.
As a measure of trust, the question is "Generally speaking, would you say that
most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?"
The answer could be either "Most people can be trusted" (1) or "Can’t be too
careful" (0). To measure the trust in the family, we use the following question:
"Could you tell me how much you trust your family?", where the answer could
8One may wonder how these regional averages relate to economic development. We also
plot the residuals of a regression of family ties on the level of development of a country.
The regional order remains the same, with two exceptions: Southern Europe shows stronger
family ties than Latin America; moreover Eastern Europeans appear to have weaker ties than
Northern Europeans, indicating that GDP per capita is not what is driving our results.
7take the following values: "Trust them completely" (5), "Trust them a little"
(4), "Neither trust or distrust them" (3), "Do not trust them very much" (2),
and "Do not trust them at all" (1).
In studying the village of Chiaromonte in Southern Italy, Banﬁeld (1958)
was also struck by the reluctance to change and resignation of the peasants
of that village, which were so completely diﬀerent from the attitudes of similar
communities in the US. The author also mentions that in these societies the role
of parental education is to teach children obedience, as nothing good usually
comes from individual initiatives. To capture these cultural features of strong
family ties, we consider the following questions. As a measure of reluctance to
change we choose the following question: "On this card are three basic kinds
of attitudes concerning the society we live in. Please choose the one which best
describes your own opinion", "Society must be radically changed" (1), "Society
must be gradually improved by reforms" (2) and "Society must be valiantly
defended" (3). As a measure for obedience we consider the questions on the
virtues that children should be encouraged to learn at home9.T h e q u e s t i o n
assigns a value of 1 if the respondent believes that obedience is important and
zero if she does not mention it.
2.2 Speciﬁcation
For our within-country empirical analysis, we run a series of OLS regressions of
the following type10:
Yijt = β0 + β1family_tiesijt + β2Xijt + γj + δt + γjδt +  ijt
where the left hand side variable Yijt represents the realization of a certain
variable for individual i in country j at time t, where time is given by the survey
wave. Family_tiesijt is our variable of interest and the value of this variable is
coded as increasing with the strength of family ties. Xijt are our controls. Our
choice of controls is standard and follows the relevant literature. In order to
eliminate the impact of other country characteristics, all the regressions include
country ﬁxed eﬀects, γj, which are likely to underestimate the eﬀect of family
ties to the extent that their impact has been absorbed in the national culture.
We also include time eﬀects, δt, to take into account general trends in values
over time, and all the interactions between country and time ﬁxed eﬀects, γjδt,
to take into account shocks that are country and time speciﬁc.
It is worth noting that, despite the inclusion of country ﬁxed eﬀects, we are
well aware of the diﬃculty in interpreting the observed correlations as causal
eﬀects. Our results in this part can therefore be interpreted as mere correlations;
therefore, whenever we use the word "impact" or "eﬀect" of family ties on
political attitudes it is only to simplify the exposition.
9Tabellini (2009) uses this question in a similar vein.
10We test the robustness of our results using ordered logit and nothing changes.
82.3 Results
Our results on the relationship between family ties, political participation, trust
and reluctance to change are reported in Tables 1 and 2. According to the
political science literature11, important determinants of political behavior are
demographic characteristics such as age, gender, race and especially education
and income. Education appears to be the most important determinant of polit-
ical interest as it is the best proxy for both information and civic virtues. The
eﬀect of age can be ambiguous, since young people should be more militant, but
life experience should increase one’s information and retired people may have
more time in their hands. According to the literature, marital status should
not be such an important determinant of interest in politics. Higher income
households should be more interested in politics. Interest in politics and polit-
ical action should be more diﬀused among men. We also control for religious
denomination, as diﬀerences in participation in politics could be the result of the
acquisition of civic skills through associational membership. Verba et al. (1995)
for example show that Catholic and Protestant churches develop diﬀerent levels
of such skills and this could explain the relatively low level of Latino political
participation.
The results reported in Table 1 are broadly in line with previous ﬁndings.
In our sample, interest in politics grows with income and education12.M e n
are always more interested in politics and more active in political activity. The
relationship between interest in politics and age is u-shaped. Employed people
are more likely to discuss politics than people out of the labor force (the ex-
cluded group) and the unemployed. There is no diﬀerence for many measures
of political action between employed and the unemployed, on the other hand
unemployed people are more likely to participate in the occupation of buildings,
as expected. Married and single people are more interested and tend to discuss
more about political matters than divorced people. But, married people are
more reluctant to participate in political activism, as opposed to singles who
are especially more likely to attend demonstrations. The most likely interpre-
tation is that singles have more time since they (generally) have no children,
and they may be more left leaning.13 Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox sub-
jects show lower levels of political participation, compared to other religions and
atheists. At least in our sample, there is no diﬀerence in political participation
between Catholics and Protestants.
Our variable on the strength of family ties is always signiﬁcant with the
expected sign even after controlling for country, year ﬁxed eﬀects, their interac-
tions and the whole range of individual controls. Individuals with strong family
ties are consistently less interested in politics and also less likely to participate
in any form of political activity from discussing politics to volunteering for a
11See Wolﬁnger and Rosestone (1980) for a survey.
12The eﬀect of education is consistent with the analysis of Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer
(2007) on the role of education in sustaining democratic institutions and political participation.
13Also political activism related to gay group activities would be primarily performed by
singles.
9political party to the most active forms of political participation, such as strikes,
demonstrations or signing a petition. The magnitude of the coeﬃcients is not
negligible: moving from the lowest 5th percentile to the highest 5th percentile of
the strength of family ties is equivalent to the impact of belonging to the highest
income group of the income distribution and slightly smaller than the eﬀect of
having only primary education relative to the highest level of education. The
impact is therefore substantial as income and education are the most important
determinants of political participation.
Table 2 shows results on trust, reluctance to change and obedience. In
particular, we ﬁnd a negative correlation between family ties and trust, but a
positive correlation between family ties and trust in the family. This negative
association between family ties and generalized trust, a critical component of
social capital is at the core of the amoral familism hypothesis of Banﬁeld (1958).
The impact of family ties on trust is also substantial, moving from the lowest 5th
percentile to the highest 5th percentile in the strength of family ties is equivalent
to almost double the eﬀect of the impact of having only primary education and
of belonging to the highest level of the income distribution.
We ﬁnally look at two other variables that should help to perpetuate amoral
familism across generations: these variables are obedience as one of the most
important values that should be transmitted to children and the reluctance
to change the society. Results are consistent with our prior: individuals with
strong family ties also think that children should be obedient and that society
should be valiantly defended and not radically changed. Given the emphasis
on obedience strong family ties tend to persist14. The magnitude of the eﬀect
is comparable to the impact of family ties on trust.
3 Evidence on immigrants
We now turn to evidence drawn from immigrants. As discussed in the intro-
duction, several papers have used this approach to help establish causality and
to test whether cultural traits travel with people. That is, if immigrants behave
in their new country of residence as at home, this would show two things. First,
the eﬀect of family ties is not an artifact of diﬀerences across countries in insti-
tutions, policies etc. Even though in the cross-country evidence presented above
we always included country ﬁxed eﬀects it is still worth checking that family
ties matter when individuals coming from diﬀerent countries of origin face the
same institutional and economic environment. Second, that immigrants behave
in their new countries of residence as they did at home. This shows that family
ties stick with people when they move. Obviously cultural assimilation does take
place and an important avenue for future research is to examine the speed of
it15. The literature reviewed in the introduction generally looks at immigrants
14Tabellini (2009) shows, using the same answer for the WWS, that reliance on obedience is
a component of cultural traits associated with lower level of development in European regions.
15For interesting empirical work on persistence of cultural traits see Guiso Sapienza and
Zingales (2009), and Tabellini (2008) for a model of cultural transmission of trust.
10in the US16. Here we consider immigrants in 32 destination countries, so our re-
sults cannot be driven by some special features of a particular receiving country
(the US). Our sample consists of second-generation immigrants, i.e. individuals
born in a given country and whose father was born abroad. We associate to
each immigrant the measure of family ties constructed from the World Value
Survey, i.e. we associate to each immigrant living in one of the 32 countries of
the survey the average level of family ties of his/her country of origin.
3.1 Dependent variables
3.1.1 Political attitudes
We select similar types of questions on political interest, political action and
reluctance to change; however, due to data availability the variables are in some
cases not the same. As measures of political attitudes we select the following
questions: Three measures of time spent per week watching TV, reading news-
papers or listening to radio programmes about politics and current aﬀairs. The
questions are as follows: "On a average weekday, how much of your time watch-
ing television is spent watching news or programmes about politics and current
aﬀairs", "On an average weekday, how much of your time listening to the radio
is spent listening to news or programmes about politics and current aﬀairs?",
"On an average weekday, how much of your time is spent reading newspapers
about politics and current aﬀairs?"; the answer to the three questions is coded
in the following way: "No time at all" (0), "Less than 0.5 hour" (1), "0.5 hour
to 1 hour" (2), "More than 1 hour, up to 1.5 hours" (3), "More than 1.5 hours,
up to 2 hours" (4), "More than 2 hours, up to 2.5 hours" (5), "More than 2.5
hours, up to 3 hours" (6), "More than 3 hours" (7). The fourth measure asks
the respondent "How interested are you in politics", and the answer can take
three values: "Very interested" (3), Quite interested (2) and Hardly interested
(1).
We also select three questions of political action similar to the ones of the
World Value Survey. The questions are: "During the last 12 months, have
you done any of the following: Signed a petition, taken part in a lawful public
demonstration and boycotted certain products?", and the answer is simply "Yes"
or "No". As in the World Value survey, there are three diﬀerent questions for
each type of political activity. Note that this question is somewhat diﬀerent
than the World Value Survey, where the respondent was asked if he/she ever
did any of this action or if he/she could contemplate doing it. The answer to
the European Social Survey is much more demanding as it asks the respondent
about the actual action in the last 12 months.
16Exceptions are Alesina and Giuliano (2007) and Luttmer and Singhal (2008) who also use
evidence from the European Social Survey.
113.1.2 Trust and reluctance to change
We also replicate our analysis using a standard measure of generalized trust. The
question in the ESS is phrased as follows: "Using this card, generally speaking,
would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful
in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you
can’t be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted." The European
Social Survey does not have any question on obedience as an important value
to be transmitted to children, therefore we choose a question that should pick
up obedience and reluctance to change. We select the following question: "Now
Iw i l lb r i e ﬂy describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me
how much each person is or is not like you. She/he believes that people should
do what they are told. She/he thinks people should follow rules at all times, even
when no-one is watching," the answer could be "Very much like me" (6), "Like
me" (5) and "Somewhat like me" (4), "A little like me" (3), "Not like me" (2),
"Not like me at all" (1).
3.2 Speciﬁcation
For consistency with the regressions of the previous section, we run the following
model in OLS regressions17:
Yikc = α0 + α1family_tiesk + α2Xi + δc + εikc
where Yikc is the left hand side of interest for individual i, living in coun-
try c and whose father comes from country k. Xi are individual controls,
family_tiesk is our measure of the strength of family ties which varies by im-
migrant’s country of origin and δc is a full set of country of residence dummies.
Standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level.
3.3 Results
I nT a b l e3 ,w et e s tf o rt h ee ﬀects of family ties on political interest, political
action, trust and reluctance to change among immigrants. We ﬁnd a strong
eﬀect of family ties on almost all variables of interest. Immigrants coming
from countries with strong family ties tend to follow less political events (the
coeﬃcients on following politics on TV, the radio or the newspapers is always
negative and signiﬁcant with the exception of watching political news on TV)
and are generally less interested in politics.
The results for political activism are a bit weaker than the within-country
analysis. One possibility, as mentioned above, is that the deﬁnition of political
activism is much more strict in the ESS compared to the WVS as it asks re-
spondents whether they were involved in these forms of political action in the
last 12 months. Also immigrants can be a bit more reluctant to be involved in
this type of political action in a foreign country as this could have some eﬀect
on the residence status of their families.
17As before, we also run ordered logit and our results do not change.
12We ﬁnd a very strong result on the impact of family ties on generalized trust.
Looking at the impact of family ties and trust could be more problematic than
political participation. Both trust and family ties could be cultural values that
tend to persist across generations, therefore it is more diﬃcult to argue that one
is causing the other. For that reason, we do a horse race between family ties
and generalized trust in the country of origin (column 9). Trust in the country
of origin is an important determinant of individual trust among immigrants;
however, its eﬀect disappears when we include our measure of family ties. This
result is consistent with the story that family ties could be an important deter-
minant of social capital. Using experimental evidence, Ermish and Gambetta
(2008) show that people with strong family ties have a lower level of trust in
stranger compared to people with weak family ties. They also argue that this
association is causal rather than the result of selection.
In the last column we ﬁnally show that strong family ties immigrants tend
to follow rules more strictly than immigrants coming from countries with weak
family ties. The results on immigrants are similar in magnitude to the results
on the within country analysis: moving from the lowest 5th percentile to the
highest 5th percentile of the strength of family ties has the same eﬀect of having
only primary education relative to the excluded group of those who have higher
education. The results on trust are particularly telling, as in this case the
impact of moving from the lowest 5th percentile to the highest 5th percentile of
the strength of family ties is almost three times as large as the impact of having
only primary education.
The other variables aﬀect political participation, trust and reluctance to
change in the expected direction. Higher income households are more interested
in politics (with the exception of listening to political programs on the radio for
which income has a negative eﬀect), similarly for individuals with a higher level
of education. Higher income households also tend to trust more and follow rules
less. Education has the same eﬀect. As before, men tend to be more interested
in politics (although in the ESS they are less likely to sign a petition), trust
more and follow rules less. As before, and consistently with the literature on
political participation, marital status is not a relevant determinant of political
participation. Catholic and Orthodox immigrants tend to have much lower levels
of political participation and tend to place a lot of emphasis on the importance
of following rules as a critical value.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
Individuals with strong family ties do not engage much in political activity and
are generally less interested in politics. Also, family ties and generalized trust
are substitutes rather than complements. We have established these results
with two sets of regressions. The ﬁrst involves within-country comparisons
of individuals using data drawn from the World Value Survey. The second
considers the behavior of immigrants who have moved to one of 32 diﬀerent
destination countries. We conﬁrm the relationship between family ties, trust
13and political participation even among immigrants, independ of the destination
country.
Amoral familism is an extreme version of strong family ties, which, according
to Banﬁeld (1958), is a major determinant of underdevelopment. If people do
not engage at all in political activities and have no interest in public aﬀairs,
they do not provide any incentive for elected politicians to be attentive to the
common good. Moreover, if citizens do not trust others, including politicians,
the latter have no reason to behave in a trustworthy manner, and may as well
pursue private interests, as Banﬁeld (1958) noted in his study of a Southern
Italian village. Thus, strong family ties, related to a low level of social capital,
may bring about a poor quality of politicians and a high level of corruption.
Results by Nannicini et al (2009) on Italy are consistent with this hypothesis,
which deserves further study.
Political participation may turn ugly in certain cases. Would strong family
ties provide a defense against degenerate political participation? Work by Todd
(1985) stresses the relationship between the diﬀusion of certain ideologies, in-
cluding undemocratic ones, and the structure of the family. This is a fascinating
line of research worth pursuing.
Finally in this paper we have emphasized how the structure of the family,
and family ties in particular, are slow moving. Indeed they are, but they are
not immobile. Like glaciers they slowly adjust to the external environment. Fu-
ture research should tackle this question in three ways. First, how long does it
take for cultural values to adjust in a melting pot like the US? Second, whether
there is convergence of family values in diﬀerent countries, perhaps due to more
frequent contacts between individuals of diﬀerent nationalities. Is globalization
making everybody more similar even in cultural matters, or is it creating in-
centives to preserve local cultures?18 Third, since family ties slowly evolve over
time, a primary focus of research should be their co-evolution and interplay with
economic institutions. Alesina et al. (2010) investigate the interaction between
family ties and the coevolution of labor market institutions in a society, ﬁnding
evidence of a strong complementarity between family ties and the stringency of
labor market regulations.
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Family Ties and Political Participation 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
 Discuss  political 
matter 
Unpaid work 













Family ties  -0.012  -0.001  -0.012  -0.029 -0.046  -0.034  -0.039 -0.026 
 (0.002)***  (0.001)**  (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***  (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Male 0.178  0.027  0.179  0.077  0.115  0.141  0.097  0.060 
 (0.003)***  (0.001)***  (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)***  (0.003)*** (0.002)***
Primary -0.322  -0.028  -0.232  -0.306 -0.221  -0.280  -0.088 -0.035 
 (0.005)***  (0.003)***  (0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)***  (0.005)*** (0.004)***
Secondary -0.153 -0.016  -0.140  -0.151 -0.145  -0.177  -0.073 -0.032 
 (0.005)***  (0.002)***  (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)***  (0.004)*** (0.003)***
Age 0.178  0.017  0.099  0.122  0.082  0.107  0.037  0.006 
 (0.006)***  (0.002)***  (0.008)*** (0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.007)***  (0.005)*** (0.004) 
Age squared  -0.016  -0.001  -0.005 -0.015 -0.012 -0.015 -0.008 -0.003 
 (0.001)***  (0.000)***  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***  (0.001)*** (0.000)***
Employed 0.039 0.008  -0.009  0.060  0.039  0.062  0.030  0.007 
 (0.004)***  (0.002)***  (0.005)*  (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)***  (0.003)*** (0.003)***
Unemployed 0.017  0.006  -0.004  0.003  0.030  0.031  0.035  0.020 
 (0.007)**  (0.003)**  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007)*** (0.007)***  (0.006)*** (0.005)***
Married 0.023  0.003  0.011  -0.003  -0.012 -0.005 -0.023  -0.013 
 (0.005)***  (0.002)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.005)** (0.006)  (0.004)*** (0.003)***
Single 0.037  0.002  0.033  0.021  0.029  0.059  0.013  0.017 
 (0.007)***  (0.002)  (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)***  (0.006)** (0.005)***
Catholic -0.012  -0.003  -0.045  -0.013 -0.043  -0.043  -0.045 -0.043 
 (0.005)**  (0.002)**  (0.006)*** (0.006)** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)***
Protestant 0.004 -0.002  -0.038  0.025 -0.039  -0.052  -0.047 -0.045 
 (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.008)*** (0.007)***  (0.007)*** (0.007)***  (0.006)*** (0.005)***
Orthodox -0.004 -0.008  -0.022  -0.030 -0.023  0.016  -0.011 -0.009 
 (0.008)  (0.003)***  (0.010)** (0.010)***  (0.008)*** (0.010)  (0.007)*  (0.005)* 
Medium income  0.056  0.001  0.016  0.078  0.035  0.038  0.010  -0.005 
 (0.004)***  (0.002)  (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)***  (0.003)*** (0.003)* 19 
 
Higher income  0.113  0.004  0.068  0.144  0.065  0.075  0.026  -0.007 
 (0.004)***  (0.002)**  (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)***  (0.004)*** (0.003)** 
Observations 163633  88198  121227  149800  145421  151073  145858  144532 
R-squared 0.14  0.06  0.10  0.28 0.18  0.15  0.12 0.10 
Notes: [1] Each regression controls for country and wave fixed effects and all their interactions; [2] Robust standard errors in parenthesis, *** significant 

































Family Ties, Trust, Reluctance to Change and Obedience 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Generalized Trust  Trust the Family  Child Qualities: 
Obedience 
Basic Kinds of 
Attitudes 
Concerning Society
Family ties  -0.006  0.074  0.026  0.018 
 (0.001)***  (0.004)***  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Male  0.006 0.014 0.001 -0.031 
 (0.002)**  (0.007)**  (0.002)  (0.003)*** 
Primary -0.064  -0.070  0.120  0.063 
 (0.004)***  (0.022)***  (0.004)*** (0.005)*** 
Secondary -0.052  -0.050  0.063  0.036 
 (0.003)***  (0.016)***  (0.003)*** (0.004)*** 
Age 0.031  -0.028  -0.051  -0.018 
 (0.004)***  (0.014)**  (0.005)*** (0.006)*** 
Age squared  -0.003  0.004  0.006  0.004 
 (0.000)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Employed 0.008  0.002  -0.008  -0.015 
 (0.003)***  (0.009)  (0.003)*** (0.004)*** 
Unemployed -0.014 -0.054 0.005 -0.010 
 (0.004)***  (0.018)***  (0.005)  (0.006) 
Married  0.011 0.115 0.007 0.002 
 (0.004)***  (0.013)***  (0.004)*  (0.005) 
Single 0.025  0.073  -0.013  -0.004 
 (0.005)***  (0.017)*** (0.005)***  (0.006) 
Catholic -0.001  0.042  0.014  0.020 
 (0.003)  (0.009)***  (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
Protestant  0.018 0.019 0.030 0.040 
 (0.005)***  (0.012)  (0.005)*** (0.006)*** 
Orthodox -0.009  0.001  0.020  0.011 
 (0.006)  (0.035)  (0.006)***  (0.007) 
Observations  159721 39895 164658  129835 
R-squared  0.10 0.19 0.12 0.05 
Notes: [1] Each regression controls for country and wave fixed effects and their interactions; [2] Robust standard errors in parenthesis, *** significant at 
1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  21 
 
Table 3 
Family Ties, Political Participation and Reluctance to Change  
Evidence from Second-Generation Immigrants in 32 Destination Countries 















Trust Trust  Follow 
rules 
Family ties in the country  -0.025  -0.129  -0.084 -0.094 0.025 0.035 -0.025 -0.413 -0.347 0.130 
of  origin  (0.043) (0.071)* (0.044)* (0.054)* (0.024) (0.018) (0.019)  (0.099)*** (0.094)*** (0.076)* 
Age  0.028 0.029 -0.001 0.021 0.007 0.000 0.010 -0.009  -0.010  -0.014 
 (0.005)***  (0.007)*** (0.005)  (0.006)*** (0.002)***  (0.002)  (0.002)*** (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) 
Age  squared  -0.000 -0.000  0.000  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)* (0.000)*** (0.000)**  (0.000)* (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)***
Male  0.202 0.078  0.163  0.271 -0.035 0.004 -0.004 0.172 0.174 0.045 
 (0.043)***  (0.047)  (0.026)***  (0.030)*** (0.010)***  (0.008)  (0.011) (0.078)**  (0.077)** (0.037) 
Married  0.065  0.076  -0.037  -0.039 -0.017 -0.014 -0.023 -0.154 -0.152 0.159 
  (0.038)*  (0.072) (0.050) (0.033)  (0.014)  (0.009)  (0.012)* (0.083)* (0.083)*  (0.049)***
Single  0.060 -0.023 -0.016 0.031 0.055 0.033 0.051 -0.140  -0.145  -0.114 
  (0.064)  (0.087) (0.067) (0.049)  (0.015)***  (0.013)**  (0.012)*** (0.143) (0.141) (0.079) 
Primary  -0.195 -0.190  -0.412  -0.621 -0.182 -0.069 -0.135 -1.071 -1.066 0.224 
 (0.069)***  (0.130)  (0.056)***  (0.064)*** (0.033)*** (0.015)*** (0.027)*** (0.107)*** (0.106)*** (0.084)***
Secondary  -0.101 -0.090  -0.222  -0.297 -0.095 -0.036 -0.109 -0.725 -0.727 0.217 
  (0.046)** (0.039)** (0.018)***  (0.022)*** (0.021)*** (0.010)*** (0.022)*** (0.080)*** (0.081)*** (0.041)***
Unemployed  0.025 -0.442  0.083  -0.058 -0.042 -0.000 -0.008 -0.509 -0.508 -0.140 
 (0.062)  (0.062)*** (0.066)  (0.033)*  (0.023)*  (0.021) (0.029)  (0.155)*** (0.154)*** (0.100) 
Out of labor force  0.080  -0.002  0.072  0.035  -0.002  -0.014  0.031  0.024  0.023  -0.039 
  (0.041)* (0.054) (0.030)** (0.030)  (0.014) (0.015)  (0.012)*** (0.057) (0.057) (0.041) 
Family income  -0.015  -0.041  0.029  0.051 0.006 -0.001 0.003 0.066 0.065 -0.027 
 (0.011)  (0.014)*** (0.009)***  (0.007)*** (0.003)** (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.019)*** (0.018)*** (0.011)** 
Catholic  -0.073 0.027  0.004  -0.053 -0.050 -0.035 -0.057 -0.059 -0.059 0.164 
 (0.040)*  (0.058)  (0.050)  (0.031)*  (0.013)***  (0.010)*** (0.014)*** (0.089) (0.090)  (0.080)** 
Orthodox  -0.080 -0.082  -0.150  -0.069 -0.034 -0.033 -0.014 0.025  0.033  0.112 
 (0.069)  (0.082)  (0.031)***  (0.049)  (0.019)*  (0.012)*** (0.016) (0.107) (0.104) (0.068) 
Protestant  -0.037  -0.058 0.032  0.025 0.003 -0.028  -0.017 0.025 0.021 0.133 
  (0.071)  (0.053) (0.051) (0.052)  (0.024)  (0.017) (0.019) (0.169) (0.167) (0.084) 
Trust  in  the  country             0.393   
of  origin             (0.326)   22 
 
Observations  4437 3507  3436  4632 4616 4628 4618 4632 4632 4475 
R-squared  0.11 0.07  0.12  0.17 0.14 0.05 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.11 
Notes: [1] Each regression controls for country of destination fixed effects; [2] Standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level, *** significant 










































Argentina  Argentina Albania  Albania 
Australia  Austria Azerbaijan  Algeria 
Belgium  Belgium Argentina  Argentina 
Canada  Brazil Australia  Austria 
Denmark  Bulgaria Bangladesh  Bangladesh 
France  Belarus Armenia  Belgium 
Hungary  Canada  Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Iceland  Chile Brazil  Bulgaria 
Ireland  China Bulgaria  Belarus 
Italy  Czech Republic  Belarus  Canada 
Japan  Denmark Chile  Chile 
Republic of Korea  Estonia China  China 
Malta  Finland Taiwan    Croatia 
Netherlands  France Colombia  Czech  Republic 
Norway  Germany Croatia  Denmark 
Spain  Hungary Czech  Republic  Estonia 
Sweden  Iceland Dominican  Republic  Finland 
Great Britain  India El  Salvador  France 
United states  Ireland Estonia  Germany 
West Germany  Italy Finland  Greece 
Northern Ireland  Japan Georgia  Hungary 
  Republic of Korea  Germany  Iceland 
 Latvia  Hungary  India 
 Lithuania  India  Indonesia 
 Malta  Japan  Iran   
  Mexico  Republic of Korea  Iraq 
 Netherlands  Latvia  Ireland 
 Nigeria  Lithuania  Israel 
 Norway  Mexico  Italy 
 Poland  Moldova  Japan 
 Portugal  New  Zealand  Jordan 
  Romania  Nigeria  Republic of Korea 
 Russian  Fed.  Norway  Kyrgyzstan 
 Slovakia  Pakistan  Latvia 
 Slovenia  Peru Lithuania 
 South  Africa  Philippines  Luxembourg 
 Spain  Poland  Malta 
 Sweden  Puerto  Rico  Mexico 
 Switzerland  Romania  Moldova 
 Turkey  Russian  Federation  Morocco 24 
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1  Austria Austria Austria 
2  Belgium Belgium Belgium 
3    B u l g a r i a  
4  Switzerland Switzerland Switzerland 
5  Czech Republic  Czech Republic   
6    C y p r u s  
7  Germany Germany Germany 
8  Denmark Denmark Denmark 
9   Estonia  Estonia 
10  Spain Spain Spain 
11  Finland Finland Finland 
12  France France France 
13  Great Britain  Great Britain  Great Britain 
14  Greece Greece  
15  Hungary Hungary Hungary 
16  Ireland Ireland Ireland 
17  Israel    
18   Iceland   
19    Latvia 
20  Italy Italy  
21  Luxembourg Luxembourg  
22  Netherland Netherlands  Netherlands 
23  Norway Norway Norway 
24  Poland Poland Poland 
25  Portugal Portugal Portugal 
26    R o m a n i a  
27    Russia 
28  Sweden Sweden Sweden 
29  Slovenia Slovenia Slovenia 
30   Slovakia  Slovakia 
31   Turkey   
















World Value Survey: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean  S.D.  Min  Max 
Parents responsibilities  1.776  0.417  1  2 
Respect and love for parents  1.802  0.398  1  2 
Family important in life  3.857  0.412  1  4 
Discuss political matters  1.858  0.668  1  3 
Unpaid work in polit. parties  0.035  0.185  0  1 
Interest in politics  1.765  0.706  1  3 
Signing a petition  2.042  0.809  1  3 
Joining in boycotts  1.512  0.660  1  3 
Attending demonstration  1.732  0.744  1  3 
Joining strikes  1.299  0.559  1  3 
Occupying buildings  1.173  0.433  1  3 
Generalized trust  0.295  0.456  0  1 
Trust the family  4.705  0.733  1  5 
Obedience 0.356  0.478  0  1 
Type of society  2.071  0.529  1  3 
Male 0.480  0.500  0  1 
Primary 0.253  0.435  0  1 
Secondary 0.300  0.458  0  1 
Age 41.237  16.333  15  101 
Employed 0.543  0.498  0  1 
Unemployed 0.078  0.269  0  1 
Married 0.642  0.479  0  1 
Single 0.238  0.426  0  1 
Medium Income  0.370  0.483  0  1 
High Income  0.292  0.455  0  1 
Catholic 0.325  0.468  0  1 
Protestant 0.126  0.332  0  1 















European Social Survey 
Summary Statistics, Second Generation Immigrants 
 
 Mean  S.D.  Min  Max 
TV watching politics  1.915  1.269  0  7 
News politics  1.199  0.826  0  7 
Interested in politics  2.413  0.912  1  4 
Generalized trust  5.072  2.476  0  10 
Follow rules  3.811  1.393  1  6 
Family ties  -0.167  0.344  -0.917  0.498 
Age 47.866  17.043  14  94 
Male 0.447  0.497  0  1 
Married 0.560  0.496  0  1 
Single 0.214  0.410  0  1 
Primary 0.141  0.348  0  1 
Secondary 0.610  0.488  0  1 
Unemployed 0.050  0.218  0  1 
Out of labor force  0.528  0.499  0  1 
Family income  5.905  2.953  1  12 
Protestant .0976  .2968  0  1 
Catholic   .2676  .4428  0  1 
Orthodox .1343  .3410  0  1 

























European Social Survey 
Summary Statistics, Second Generation Immigrants, by Country of Origin 
Cou.  
of orig. 
Obs. TV News  Inter.   
pol. 
Trust   Rules Fam. 
ties 






AT  95  1.89  1.18 2.64 5.42  3.85  -0.39 54.3  0.39 0.55  0.07 0.01  6.86 .33  .40  .17  .02 
BE  72  1.75  1.08 2.12 5.30  3.49  -0.17 47.2  0.47 0.43  0.13 0.06  7.31 .29  .40  .03  .01 
BG  43  2.34  1.38 2.32 4.09  4.16  -0.02 43.1  0.32 0.70  0.32 0.09  4.42 .27  .02  .02  .41 
BY  109 1.73 1.05  2.22 4.61  4.16  -0.65 50.9  0.27 0.44 0.06  0.03  3.14 .41  .10  .02  .40 
CA  13  2.15  1.37 2.53 6.38  3.30  0.34 43.1  0.69 0.54  0.08 0.08  6.92 .37  .21  .14  .09 
CZ  124 1.86 1.24  2.58 4.50  3.81  -0.28 48.9  0.45 0.65 0.05  0.02  5.61 .25  .43  .08  .01 
DE 419 1.97 1.40  2.70 5.76  3.56  -0.78 49.6  0.44 0.59 0.10  0.03  7.61 .37  .30  .19  .04 
DK  59  1.95  1.29 2.66 7.00  3.79  -0.91 45.1  0.47 0.59  0.08 0.02  8.30 .66  .03  .24 0 
EE  18  2.11  1.47 2.61 5.61  3.94  -0.46 51.4  0.33 0.50  0.05 0.11  6.00 .23  .02  .23  .08 
ES  90  1.82  1.12 2.32  4.8 3.54  0.21 43.2  0.49 0.53  0.10 0.08  7.47 .36  .45  .02 0 
FI  149  2.18  1.25 2.74 6.03  3.49  -0.50 46.5  0.35 0.40  0.14 0.05  7.09 .57  .01  .23 0 
FR  224  1.81  1.20 2.51 5.14  3.50  -0.02 44.5  0.49 0.55  0.11 0.05  7.79 .21  .40  .05 0 
GB  189  1.94  1.27 2.42 6.14  3.66  -0.19 45.1  0.45 0.52  0.09 0.02  7.83 .29  .40  .14 0 
GR  48  2.25  1.29 2.52 4.25  4.17  -0.38 48.1  0.40 0.48  0.27 0.08  5.00 .24  .08  .02  .32 
HR  54  1.61  1.15 2.30 4.94  3.35  -0.13 48.1  0.33 0.65  0.16 0.07  6.44 .21  .55  .01  .02 
HU  69  1.88  1.28 2.42 4.07  3.59  -0.05 50.9  0.46 0.62  0.09 0.09  5.56 .22  .42  .12  .02 
ID  61  2.19  1.17 2.81 5.67  4.05  0.49 50.1  0.34 0.49  0.02 0.00  7.07 .52  .15  .20  .02 
IE  47  2.25  1.17 2.55 5.51  3.57  0.02 50.8  0.51 0.58  0.04 0.02  7.34 .36  .52  .06 0 
IN  40  2.15  1.34 2.50 5.41  4.08  0.18 41.8  0.60 0.55  0.07 0.05  7.45 .41  .16  .08 0 
IT  379  1.75  1.12 2.30 4.75  3.59  0.20 47.6  0.55 0.57  0.23 0.04  7.17 .33  .57  .03 0 
KZ  17  2.06  0.66 2.17 4.76  3.75  -0.19 42.82 0.47 0.76  0.00 0.06  4.47 .27  .08  .15  .24 
LT  37  1.97  1.11 2.13 5.00  4.19  -0.83 46.54 0.40 0.51  0.08 0.05  4.10 .26  .34  .07  .06 
LV 21  1.52 1 2.14  5.04  3.29  -0.19 42.61 0.29 0.43  0.09  0.00  3.52 .19  .05  .15  .15 
NL  95  2.06  1.28 2.43 5.51  3.48  -0.74 49.87 0.53 0.75  0.16 0.03  7.95 .59  .33  .07  .00 
PL  216 1.86 1.20  2.39 4.98  3.75  0.21 46.67 0.43 0.49 0.05  0.07  6.25 .18  .43  .08  .05 29 
 
PT  208  1.58  0.82 1.96 4.84  4.08  0.09 37.82 0.54 0.71  0.51 0.02  7.36 .12  .59  .01 0 
RO 105 1.90 1.15  2.58 4.49  3.80  0.11 45.3  0.44 0.63 0.10  0.09  5.41 .10  .23  .10  .13 
RU  851 1.97 1.16  2.38 4.82  3.98  -0.17 52.8  0.38 0.53 0.09  0.06  3.20 .24  .04  .06  .41 
SE  52  1.90  1.26 2.58 6.73  4.10  -0.64 48.1  0.27 0.46  0.02 0.04  8.2  .66  .04  .46 0 
SK  87  1.86  1.24 2.11 4.31  4.04  -0.12 48.3  0.55 0.52  0.07 0.14  4.57 .16  .33  .03  .02 
TR  280 1.97 1.20  2.26 4.26  4.26  0.17 44.8  0.52 0.65 0.36  0.09  5.48 .16  .01  .01  .30 
UA 180 1.93 1.14  2.36 4.84  3.91  -0.13 46.3  0.44 0.55 0.04  0.05  3.37 .27  .10  .02  .27 
 
 
 
 
 
 